Articles | Open Access | Vol. 3 No. 11 (2023): Volume 03 Issue 11 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.37547/marketing-fmmej-03-11-02

TRADING PLACES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY COMPARING REALLOCATION MECHANISMS FOR PRIORITY QUEUING

Aleid Van Dijk , International Strategy & Marketing,Faculty Of Economics And Business,University Of Amsterdam, Amsterdam,The Netherlands

Abstract

This experimental study investigates the efficacy of different reallocation mechanisms in the context of priority queuing, exploring how entities can dynamically "trade places" to optimize performance. Through controlled experiments, we evaluate the impact of various reallocation strategies on queue dynamics, service efficiency, and overall system effectiveness. The research aims to provide insights into the strengths and limitations of different mechanisms, offering practical guidance for optimizing priority queuing systems in diverse applications.

Keywords

Priority Queuing, Reallocation Mechanisms, Queue Dynamics

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How to Cite

Aleid Van Dijk. (2023). TRADING PLACES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY COMPARING REALLOCATION MECHANISMS FOR PRIORITY QUEUING. Frontline Marketing, Management and Economics Journal, 3(11), 10–15. https://doi.org/10.37547/marketing-fmmej-03-11-02