
TRADING PLACES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY COMPARING REALLOCATION MECHANISMS FOR PRIORITY QUEUING
Aleid Van Dijk , International Strategy & Marketing,Faculty Of Economics And Business,University Of Amsterdam, Amsterdam,The NetherlandsAbstract
This experimental study investigates the efficacy of different reallocation mechanisms in the context of priority queuing, exploring how entities can dynamically "trade places" to optimize performance. Through controlled experiments, we evaluate the impact of various reallocation strategies on queue dynamics, service efficiency, and overall system effectiveness. The research aims to provide insights into the strengths and limitations of different mechanisms, offering practical guidance for optimizing priority queuing systems in diverse applications.
Keywords
Priority Queuing, Reallocation Mechanisms, Queue Dynamics
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