The article examines the earliest ethnographic studies in the territory of Karakalpakstan and the activities of the Khorezm archaeological-ethnographic expedition in the region. It discusses the expedition’s role in shaping the ethnographic discourse of Karakalpakstan, highlighting how field research contributed to the study of local social structures, material culture, and ethnic identity. The author presents their own perspective on the historical and ethnographic significance of this scientific work.

The article examines the specific features of Pakistan’s political development from independence in 1947 to the end of the first cycle of military rule in 1971. Drawing on a wide range of historical studies and documentary materials, the research analyses how the “two-nation theory” and the circumstances of partition shaped a fragile state structure marked by weak civil institutions, deep ethno-linguistic and regional cleavages, and chronic political instability. Particular attention is paid to the consolidation of the army as the key political actor and to the establishment of the military regimes of General Muhammad Ayub Khan and General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan. The study evaluates Ayub Khan’s model of “basic democracies”, the 1962 Constitution and controlled presidential elections, showing how attempts at guided modernisation combined with authoritarian practices intensified social and regional tensions, especially in East Pakistan. The article further explores Yahya Khan’s policies, the 1970 general elections, the failure to transfer power to the Awami League, the escalation of internal conflict, the 1971 war with India and the emergence of Bangladesh. The conclusions highlight that military rule did not ensure political stability or national integration, and underline the broader lessons of Pakistan’s early statehood for contemporary debates on civil–military relations, democratic governance and nation-building in newly independent and developing states, including those of Central Asia.

Objective: This article analyzes how the Nawabi regime in early 18th-century Bengal (1700-1757) employed fiscal reorganization as a strategic tool to consolidate political authority and redefine sovereignty during the decline of the Mughal Empire.

Methods: The study utilizes a historical-institutional approach, analyzing primary Persian revenue records [3], contemporary chronicles [4], and early British administrative documents [1]. A critical interpretation of evolving revenue terminology [8, 9] is used to track institutional shifts.

Results: The reorganization was characterized by a shift from standardized Mughal assessments to enhanced local revenue extraction, particularly through the imposition of new abwaˉb (extra-cesses) and the increased power to reassign land rights [10]. Crucially, the reliance on high-credit banking houses for underwriting revenue and crisis finance transformed the state into a financially dependent entity, yet strengthened its regional autonomy. The political landscape exhibited the "seismic activity" of a shifting power base, demonstrating the fragility of established political expectations.

Conclusion: The Nawabi fiscal strategy was a successful, though ultimately incomplete, declaration of regional sovereignty. Current predictive models for political decline, much like those for geological shifts, are insufficient to fully capture the speed and transformative impact of these internal fiscal negotiations. These reforms laid the critical administrative foundation later exploited by the East India Company.